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Court in and for Sa1t Lake County, Honorable Merrill C.
Faux, .Judge.
ANTHONYM. THURBER
263 South Second East
Salt Lake City, Utah
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Seventh Floor, Continental Bank Building
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In the Supreme Court of the State of Utah
ALFRED DUANE JOHNSON,
Plaintiff and Appellant,
-V'S.-

THE EMPLOYERS' FIRE
INSURANCE COMP ANY OF
Boston, Massachusett,

Case No.
11949

Defendant and RespondPnt.

BRIEF OF APPELLANT

NATURE OF THE CASE
This is an appeal from the granting of a motion to
. dismiss an action for declaratory judgment instituted
: by the appellant to obtain a declaration of the validity of
an insurance contract and of certain rights, status and
legal relations between the appellant, one Homer Richard
of Pekin, Illinois, and the respondent insurance company.
The Honorable Merrill C. Faux on December 10,
1969, granted respondent's motion to dismiss appellant's
' romplaint.

2
DISPOSI'I1ION BY '1'H

'L'RIAL C'OUR'l'

']_'he court, following hearing of rc>spondent's rnotir
to dismiss, rnled that the motion should lw grantt•d an1;
plaintiff's complaint dismissPd npon the
gronnds:
11

1

1. A plaintiff in a personal injury i:mit may nut
maintain an action against the liability insurer of tJ1,
defendant unl<>ss and until snch plaintiff has n·coven·1i,
a judgment against the defendant in a personal injun:
snit.
2. 'l'lw claim set forth in plaintiff's complaint is nu·
appropriate for declaratory n·liPf.
Plaintiff is not a proper party to an action de
termining the legal effect of a policy of insurance hetwM
tlw <lPf Pndant insurPd and anoth«r.

I
I

Appellant seeh a revernal of tlw Difitrict Conrt" \
•
I
o-rantinoof
dt'f
Pn<lant's
motion
to
dismiss
and
an
rnter
I'->
/"">
pretation of tlw Declarator)' .J udg-w«nts Ad
the ap1wllant to ohtain a d«elaration J'Psolving llllCI'!·
taintv surrounding an insurane<' ('Ontraet and ddPnuiH
1
ing r:ights, status and kgal n•lations of th<'
n:
11wans of a clPrlaraton· jndg1tH•nt ac-tion.
1

3
ATEMENT OF FACTS
17, 1969, a head-on automobile collision
· Mountain Dell Reservoir in Parley's
,ake County, Utah, involving the autolant and an automobile owned and oper1er Richard of Pekin, Illinois.

d was at the time of accident a named
respondent insurer under a policy of
ranee providing, among other coverages,
ahility with limits of $50,000 per person
' orcnrrence.

it occurred when Mr. Richard's eastbound
;s0d the center line of the highway and
1 with Mr. Johnson's westbound vehicle.
the death of said appellant's wife and
tw, severe bodily injury to appellant and
daughters, the death of Mr. Homer Richsevere bodily injury to Mr. Richard .

•vas subseqtwntly filed in the Federal Dis. the District of Utah, Central Division,
his own h0half and as guardian ad litem
tinor daughters against the said Homer
ng for jndgmPnt representing their damfrom the accident. That action is expected
lnring the summer or fall of 1970.

4
Prior to August l 0, l9G9, respondent in::-;nrPr l1n1I
issued through its agPnt, .Jack Lowman of P<>kin, ll!inoio.
and deliwred to Mr. Richard a policy of automohilP in
surance covering tlie 19G8 Chrysler automohil<'
operated by l\fr. Richard at the time of a('cident, with tl11
liability cowrage d<•serihed ahon•. On or about Augu):
10, 19G9, at Coos
Oregon, l\fr. Riehard contracte1l
to purchase a 24-foot Aljo travel trail<>r, which traill'r
was being towed
l\fr. Richard in his 19G8 Chrys!H
a11to1110hil<> at the time of the ac<'itlent complained of \i.1
appellant.
On or ahont August 10, ElG9, dPfrndant's ag-Pnt.
.John T. (.Tack) Lowman "·as notifiPd of tlw transaetim1
involving the trailH at
Rieliard's n·q11Pst and \IU'
r0qu<>stf>d to see that thP sarnP was full>· cov<>red witl1
insurance dnring and afh•r his rdnrn trip to PPkiu.
Illinois. An Pndors<>ment to tlH• policy "·as suhseqnrntl1
isl'nwd hy rPspondent, whi<'h added thP trailrr to 1!1 ,
Ri<'hard':-; autouwhilP insurancP 1iolic·)· with vari1111· \
cowrages, including bodily in.inr>· liahilit>· with th<' limit;!
ahon.i described, at an additional pr<>rninm 1d1irli r1··
spondent has hi !led and rPcPi ,·ud.
Rirn·e tl1e comrnPnC!'mPnt of the afor1•m0ntionPd ac-'
tion in Fi>d<•ral Distriet Court, thP respondPnt
has notifiPd

Tfom<•r Richard, d(•frndant in tlw

ft>deral action, and thP ap1wllant tliat said immrPr cfo
claimed Iiahilih' e<H"Pl'Ug"(' for tl1<' acciclPnt clPscribPd on

.I
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the basis of an exclusion contained in the policy voiding
ro\·erage upon the insured automobile while it is being
used for the to:v.ring of any trailer owned or hired by
the named insured and not covered by like insurance
\1ith the resp-0ndent insurer. The respondent insurer
has undertaken the defense of the action in Federal
Court under a "reservation of rights," the meaning of
\d1ich is that said insurer does not intend to pay any judgment recovered by the plaintiffs in that action.
Appellant believes that the policy exclusion relied
upon by resp-0ndent is not available to it as a policy defense for the reason that the p-0licy provides for automatic coverage of newly-acquired automobiles or trailers
provided the insured givrs the insurer notice thereof
ll'ithin thirty days from the date of acquisition and requests coverage there-0n, which notice and r<"qnest w<>rr
rlnh· eommnnirat<"d to responclrnt's agent.
'l'lw actions of respondent insurer in disclaiming
liability coverage have caused considerable uncertainty
\rith regard to the validity of the insurance policy and
the rights, status, and legal relations of the parties. It
the purpose of appellant's action to obtain in accordance with fop provisions of the DPClaratory Judgments

Act a clPelaration as to the validity and applicability of
thr• insnrnrn:e contract, and drtf'rmining tlie legal relations
of tlw

a])lwllant,

tlw

insurrd,

and

the insurance

A ppPllant SPPks an official dPelaration that

6

will
thP uncC>rtainty crPated by rPspondent iii
snrer's disclainwr of coveragP. Appellant doPs not i1,
this action St'Pk a monPy jndg11wnt or affinnati,·e re!ii·
against r(lspondent insurC>r other than sneh a declaration.:
ARG
1.

'l'h<> Declaratory .Judgments Act iwrmits and pru
vides that "any interested person" may hring an actio11
to determine quPstions of construction or validity of an:.
·written contract. rrlw Declaratory .Jndgnwnts Act j,
found in Section 78-33-2, U.C.A. (1953) and provides:
"Any person intPrested under a dePd, will or
writtt>n contract . . . may have dt•termined arn
quE>stion of construction or validity arising
tlw instrunwnt, statute, ordinance, contract. 111
franchisE' and obtain a declaration of right>.
status, or other ]pgal rPlations thPrt>nndN.''
ThP }Jlll']JOSP of tlie quotl·d statntP is to pro\'idP a
proper r!:'rnPdy wht-nevPr an mwPrtaint,\· t-xists \\'itlt i''
spect to rights, status, or other lPgal relations unckr a
statute, ordinanct-, or writ ten eon tract which coulcl lw
n'soh·ed h,\· tlie court in orcler to clarif.'· such lf•gal nla
tions, rights, :-:tatns, or th<> validit,\· of such statnt"'·
ordinances, eontraets or fnrnchisPs. TVhi+morc 1·. Jlurr(/
City, 107 Utah -1-45, 15-1- P.2d 74S. rl'l1e uneertainty whir+
exists in this casP is sHhstantial and until it is rrsol1e1I.
11
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appellant will not kno"· whether his proceeding with
fed12ral action will result in a collectible judgment or not.

'11 he appellant in this action is under the Utah deci:-;ions ''an interested pt'rson." (See discussion under Point
III below.) The insurance policy in question is, of cours12,
a written contract and there exists a question of con13truction and validity arising under that instrument
\dtich causes ambiguity and uncertainty that the court
could remove by making a declaration as contemplated
hy the quoted provisions of the Utah Dedaratory Judgments Act.
Counsel for respondent in arguing his Motion for
Summary Judt,rinent to Judge Faux relied upon the conh•ntion that Utah is not a "direct action" jurisdiction.
foJtng v. Barney, 20 Ut. 108 (l9G7). The Young case
and other Utah cases holding similarly do not deal with
declaratory judgments actions and are not in point. Unlik<• the Y 011ng casf', appellant's action her(•in is not a suit
for direct rf'coyery from tlw insurance company, but
rntlwr for a simple declaration of rights, status, and
lPgal relation hetwet-n partif's interested in the insurance
rontract. Such rf'lief appears clearly to lw that contemplated hy the Declaratory Jndgnwnts Act. 'l'he Utah
Court has stat<><l that declaratory judgment
a:-: permitted by th0 Act is a remedy to he grated when-

Pnr it will sPITP a uspfnl purpose in settling uncertain

i:;snes. Ora.11

I'.

Defa, 103 rtah 339, 135 P.2d

(1943).
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POINT

II.

The DPclaratory Judgments Act provides in Section
78-33-12 that the Act should be liberally construed in order
to accomplish its stated purpost>. The language of that
section is as follows:
''This chapter is declared to be remedial; its
purpose is to settle and to afford relief from uncertainty and insecurity with respect to rights,
status and other legal relations; and is to be
liberaJly construed and administered."
POINT

TTL

The appellant does have an int<•rpst in the irnmranr1·
contract under the Utah decisions, making him an interested person therein as contt>mplatt>d h:' tht> De>C"]aratory
.Judgme>nts Act.
The most signifiC"ant question to be determined by
the court in this appPal is whether appellant
as an "interested person" under Section 78-33-2, CCJ.
(1953). The Utah Supreme Court in 1967 decided two
cases which app•ar to establish
thf• proposition
that an injured daimant do0s havP an interest in thl'
Jiabilit:' insurance of the wrongdoer who injures hiw

PetPrson 1.'. Western Cns1lalt11 and Surety C01npa1111, 19
Ut. 2d 2G, 425 P.2d 7G9; and !Wis r. Gillicrt, 19 Ft. 2d
189, 429 P.2d 39. 'l'ht> PPterso11 easP inyo]Y<-'fl tht>- insnrN'i
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refusal to pay an injured judgment creditor of its insured
on the policy grounds that the insured had failed to cooperate in the defense of the suit against him, in which
action the insurer was the real party in interest. The
claimant obtained a judgment against the insured and,
due to the insurer's refusal to pay the judgment, commenced action directly against the insurance carrier.
The Utah Supreme Court in its opinion stated: "As a
member of the public injured by the insured, plaintiff
became a
benf>ficiary of the policy . " (at
pag-r :10)
The Court further statf>d in its opinion:
"The ever-increasing number of injurie:S from
automobile accidents and the high proportion of
drivers who have insufficient financial responsibility has been taken cognizance of by the legislatnr('s of many states in enacting laws for thf>
purpose of compelling the carrying of liability
insurance, one type of which is our own Financial
Responsihility Act. Inasmuch as the purpose of
the insurance is to protect not only the insured,
hut the puhlic
the right which arise:S in
anyone injured by an insured motorist should not
he regarded lightly, nor permitted to be subverted
by other parties over whom the injured one has no
('ontrol."
Lat<:>r in 1967 tlw Utah Supreme Court handed down
a drciHion in the Ellis case which extended the policy of
the PctPrson cas<> to COYf>r injured plaintiffs who had not
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yet become judgment creditors of the insured. Thi
Ellis case involved discoverability by the injured clai111
ant of the existence of liability insurance and of the ap]JL
cable policy limits. The Utah Supreme Court in holding
that the existence and limits of liability coverage in sueli
cases were discoverable in this state made the following
statement:

"
in passing the Safety Responsibilit1
Act the legislature has indicated as a matter of
public policy its recognition of the dangers, injun
and destruction on our highways, from which thP
public has a right to some measure of protr>dion.
When one is so injured, he lwcomes in· effect a
third-party beneficiary of the insurance of a
wrongdoPI' who injures him." (at page 192)
The status of an injured claimant as a third-party
beneficiary of the tort f easor's liability insurance polie:
arises at the time of injury, according to the languagi·
quoted above. Such claimant's status as third-party benP·
ficiary and therpfore a pt>rson interested in the policy
does not depend upon his obtaining a judgment against
the insurPd. Appellant, as a third-part)' bPneficiary nf
the insurance contract between rc>-spondent and its in
sured, not only is a person interested in thf• policy hlll
is also in fact a party to tlw ins11rance contrad. He i'
the person most int<>rested in the insnrancP contract, n;
the existPnce or ahsc>nc0 of coYPrage in IJractical tPD11'
mPans snccPss or failure in his pfforts to rPcover <la)ll·
ages for the injury to amwllant and his family.
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CONCLT!RION

The Ellis case and the Peterson case establish in Utah
the proposition that an injured party does have an interest in the contract of insurance between the insured
tort f Pas or and his insurance carrier. Whether that interest is suffi<'ient to permit direct action betwet>n the injured
party and the insurance carrier for monetary recovery
may be doubtful, but that is not the question now facing
the Court. All that appellant seeks is a declaration resolving the uncertainty which exists and determining
rights, status, and legal relations under the insurance
contra<'t. It set>ms abundantly clear that appellant's
action is precisely the type of action contemplated by
the Declaratory .Jndgments Act. Appellants is both a
interestt>d in respondent's policy of automobile
insurance and a party thereto under the Utah dt>eisions.
Should appellant be denied the declaratory relief sought,
hP will he required to prost>cute._an expensivt> and complPx litigation in thE> fE'<lnal action, totally un<'Prtain
wheth<>r any jndgmE>nt ohtained will he paid, unpaid,
or hankrupti,cl. 'l'he court should not rt>qnire him to
ltig-ate under such an uncPrtainty wlwn he could he made
('!'rtain of his status hy granting of the dt>claratory relief
'Ollp;h t.

AppPllant rt>sJwC"tfully rPquests that the judgment
of dismissal PnterPd hPrPin hy the Honorable Merrill
C. Faux, jn<lgP of

'l'hird .Judicial District Court in
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and for Salt Lake County, December 10, 1969, be re.
versed and the case remanded to that court for deter
mination of the rights, status and legal relation of the
parties under the insurance policy of respondent.
Respectfully submitted,

ANTHONY M. THURBER
Attorney for Appellant

